In Mexico, reducing corporate taxes stimulates investment more than increasing the investment tax credit or the employment tax credit does.
Policy Research
Public Economics WPS 927 This paper -a product of the Public Economics Division, Country Economics Department -is one of a series of discussion papers prepared for the research project "An Evaluation of Tax Incentives for Industrial and Technological Development" (RPO 675-10), funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget. Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Carlina Jones, room N 10-063, extension 37699 (June 1992,44 pages).
Mexico has experimented with several tax investment tax credits in Mexico. Mexico had instruments designed to promote private capital high inflation and high nominal interest rates, formation. Among such initiatives were general with real interest rates negative for certain years and industry-specific tax credits, employment tax -so firms faced severe financing constraints. In credits, and corporate tax reductions.
such a macroeconomic climate, firms see reduced tax rates as improving their cash flow and Feltenstein and Shah examine the relative a signal of an improved public policy climate. efficacy of such instruments using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model. They
In a period of economic uncertainty and carry out model simulations using three equaldecline, nonrefundable, unindexed tax credits on yield investment incentive scenarios: increases in new investments are less valuable than an investment tax credits, increases in employment immediate reduction in tax liability from both tax credits, and an equivalent reduction in the old and new capital. corporate tax rate.
Finally, in an open economy, reducing the Of the three, they find that reducing corpotax rate increases the demand for all capital rate taxes is most effective at stimulating investrather than new capital alone -so the relative ment in Mexico.
value of domestic capital rises. Accordingly, the public increases its holdings of domestic debt, Various explanations are plausible for why causing the price of domestic bonds to rise and reducing tax rates is superior to providing real interest rates to fall, stimulating investment.
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Introduction
Public policy officials in Mexico have, over the past several decades, experimented with a number of tax instruments designed to promote private capital formation. Among such initiatives were general and industry specific tax credits, employment tax credits, and corporate rate reductions. This paper examines the relative efficacy of such tax instruments using a dynamic computable general equilibrium framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an outline of the tax policy environment for the corporate sector in Mexico. Section 3 presents model details. Section 4 highlights alternate tax incentives regimes and model simulation results. Finally, a concluding section provides a summary of the results.
Tax Incentives for Investment in Mexiso
Tax incentive regimes in Mexico have undergone significant changes over time. These are briefly discussed below:
1955-1972: Between 20% (for secondary industries) and 40% (for basic industries) corporate income of Mexican majority owned enterprises was exempted from corporate taxation for periods varying between five to ten years. The same industries also could receive, upon application, exemption from certain indirect taxes and import duties on capital goods imports.
1972-1979: Industries that were seen to promote decentralization and regional development were granted import duty relief varying from 50% to 100% and reduction in corporate tax liability ranging from 10% to 40% depending upon their location and type of activity.
1979-1986s
The practice of import duty exemption was continued. In addition, tax incentives certificates (CEPROFIS) providing tax credit in the -2-range of 10-25%, depending upon location, and type and size of the industry, for investment in physical assets were introduced. These certificates were negotiable and could be used against any federal tax liability by the holder.
1986-Present: The tax incentive certificate scheme was significantly tightened and targeted to priority industries and preferred zones (See Appendix Table Al ). The top tax credit rate for CEPROFI was raised to 40% of total physical investment in 1986. In addition Mexican-owned enterprises are eligible for employment tax credits up to 30% of three times the annual area minimum wage multiplied by the number of new jobs created. In addition, full expensing of the present value of capital consumption allowance& calculated using a 7.5% discount rate was allowed in non-metropolitan areas. In the metropolitan industrialized areas of Mexico City, D.F., Monterrey and Guadalajara, only 60% of the present value of depreciation allowances could be deducted in the first year. R&D investment tax credit at 15% for the purchase of technological research (20% for small and micro enterprises), and 20% for capital purchases by technological enterprises (30% for small and micro enterprises) are currently permissible.
Further details regarding the corporate income taxation and foregone revenues due to tax incentives in Mexico is given in Appendix A.
Model Specification
In this section we will develop the model we will use to analyze a variety of fiscal issues in Mexico. In particular, the model will be designed to look at the implications for revenues, sectoral investment, and the balance of payments of a number of different tax programs. We will consider investment tax credits, and employment tax credits. The model can be easily extended to incorporate accelerated depreciation allowances, tax holidays, and immediate full expensing. Our model will also permit experimentation with changes in the structure of indirect taxation as well as the personal income tax. The model we develop is intended to be a microeconomic optimizing structure that generates macroeconomic outputs. Since our aim is empirical implementation, much of the structure we incorporate is chosen because of the availability of data.
-3 -We use a two period general equilibrium system in which all agent. have perfect foresight, and hence in period 1 correctly anticipate the price. of period 2. We need to specify the behavior of production, consumption, and government output, taxation, and deficit financing. We need also specify the exchange rate regime and the characteristics of the trade system. A oolution is found for both periods simultaneously, so that we will be determining outcomes for both years, and hence corresponding rates of change.
a. Production
There are 8 factors of production and 3 types of financial sA-et The.e are:
1-5. Capital types 9. Foreign bonds 6.
Urban labor 10. Rural labor 7.
Money 11. Land 8.
Domestic bonds
The five types of capital correspond to the five productive sectors, which do not include agriculture, that we will describe shortly. Each of these factors and financial assets is replicated in each period, so that we have, for example, period 1 capital and period 2 capital. Period 1 money will be the numeraire.
Thus the model has 22 dimensions, or prices.
An input-output matrix is used to determine intermediate and final
production. This matrix is replicated in each of two years. Corresponding to each sector in the input-output matrix, value added is produced using capital and urban labor for the non-agricultural sectors, and land and rural labor in agriculture. The technology that produces this value added is sector-specific. The specific formulation of the firm's problem is as follows. Lot yjKi, yIi be the inputs of capital and urban labor to the jth non-agricultural sector in period i. Let YGi be the outstanding stock of government infrastructure in period i. The production of value added is then given by Recall that capital is sector specific and there are two types of labor. In the case of agriculture, equation (1) takes the same form, except that land is substituted for capital and rural labor is substituted for urban labor. We are supposing that there is a single type of infrastructure, although extensions to sector specific infrastructure would present no problem. Infrastructure may be thought of, for example, as roads, communications, education, and so forth, and enters private production as an increase in productivity.
It is assumed that sector j cost-minimizes with respect to capital and urban labor, in the case of a non-agricultural sector, and with respect to land and rural labor in the case of agriculture. Sector j pays value added taxes on inputs of capital and labor, given by tiJi, tjki, respectively, in period i. We 2A program that permits the user to arbitrarily aggregate particular rows and columns is available upon request from the author. 
where va(P,YGi) is the vector of cost-minimizing value-added per unit of output, subject to P -{PKjj, PUj) and Y 0 i, and 3 The interpretation of these taxe is thus as a profit tax and a personal income tax that is withheld at the source.
period. We will assume that investment i. entirely financed by domestic borrowing, so that the investor sells domestic bonds to pay his factors of produec-ton.S Accordingly, the investor equates the coot of borrowing, given by the interest rate, with the anticipated future returns on capital.
The investor is affected by several fLocal parameters in maklng his decision. He receives an investment tax credit an well as a depreciation allowance. He also pays a capital, or profit tax, on the returns to hi.
investment. Let us define the followlng notation.
kim Investment tax credit in period 1 (percent).
dL-Depreciation allowance in period L (percent).6
tki Profit (capital) tax rate (percent)
CHi-The cost of producing the quantity Hi of capital in period i ri-The interest rate in period i.
PrK, The return to capital in period i.
Pmi-The price of money in period i.
Suppose, then, that the rental price of capital in period L+1 is Py+1.
If CHi is the cost-minimizing cost of producing the quantity of capital, Hi, then future debt obligations must be equal to the return on new capital.
Hence:
where ri is the interest rate in period i, glven bys SWe assume that all foreign borrowing for lnvestment is carrled out by the government, so that, implicitly, the government is borrowlng for the private investor but the debt thereby incurred is publicly guaranteed. In terms of Mexico, this may be viewed as the situation existing after the financial collapse.
-7 -ri -I/PBi (4) where PBi is the price of a bond in period i. 7 Thuo all mectors in the economy pay both income and profit taxes to the government, while certain sectors, in particular agriculture, may receive subsidies. Theme taxes are collected by the central government which uses them to finance its own expenditure activities.
The government produces public goods using capital and labor am inputs to production. Theme good. are divided between thome used for development, repremented by capital expenditure., and thome which are represented by current expenditure, and which have no direct impact on privato output. 8 The government'. target for the output of public goods im determined exogenously in each time period as a fraction of GDP. An attempt to model an optimizing government is thus not made.
b. Conoumption
There are two types of conmumers, representing rural and urban labor.
We suppose that both consumer classes have the same demand pattern. for goods, and that their demands for the seven different types of good. are given by constant fractions of their incomes. 9 Thuu urban and rural consumers differ only in terms of their initial wealth.
The consumers maximize intertemporal utility functions, which have am arguments the levels of consumption and leisure in each of the two periods.
We permit rural-urban migration in that rural workers can choose to become urban labor if the relative wage is favorable. The consumers maximize theme utllity functions subject to intertemporal budget constraints. The consumer -8-saves by holding money, domestic, bonds, and possibly foreign currency. He requires money for transactions purposes, but his demand for money is sensitive to changes in the interest rate. The consumer receives income from his labor, from the rental on any capital or land that he owns, and from the interest payments on bonds that he has purchased. He may also receive direct transfer payments from the government. He pays sales taxes on the goods he consumes, as well as tariffs on imported goods. The consumer's bond holdin7a
are also subject to a capital loss if the domestic interest rate falls. His maximization problem is thust
such thats
if PLui 2 PLri; otherwise log (Lui/Lri) = 0 (if the representative household i8 rural, otherwise labor holdings are constant) PB2xB2 = (1+t 2 )P 2 x 2 (Se)
where:
Xi -vector of consumption in period i.
ti -vector of aales tax rates in period i.
PLJd -price of urban labor in period i.
Lui -holding of urban labor in perlod i.
PLZi prlce of rural labor ln period i.
-9--,i -holding of rural labor in period i.
&2 -elasticity of rural/urban migration.
Pyj -price of capital in period i.
K -initial holding of capital.
6 -rate of depreciation of capital.
xLi -consumption of leisure in period i.
PMi -price of money in period i. Money in period 1 is the numeraire and hence has a price of 1. A decline in the relative price of money from one period to the next represents Inflation.
=Mi -holdings of money in period i.
PBi -discount price of a domestic bond in period i.
ri -domestic interest rate in period i.
xBi -quantity of domestic bonds purchased in period L.°i -the exchange rate in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency in period i. PBFi = foreign currency discount price of foreign bonds in period i.
xBFi -quantity of foreign bonds purchased in period i.
TRi -transfer payments from the government in period i.
a, b, c, a, B -estimated constants.
Thus the left hand side of equation (5a) There is an elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign assets, so that we do not necessarily obtain factor price equalization.
The consumer pays market prices plus sales taxes for all goods except agriculture, which may, for some consumers, be subsidized. Personal income taxes are not paid directly by the consumer but are withheld at the enterprise level, where profit taxes are also collected. The total value of the consumer's consumption in each period must be equal to his corresponding Here we make the following definltions.
(a) E 3 Mexican non-oil exports in US$s.
(b) RP -Relative US$ price index of Mexican exports to the US price index. 
log M -log M_1 -B(log Md _ log M).
Here we define In order to maintain homogeneity in consumptLon, as required in the general equilibrium model, 14 we set at = 1 and obtain log M/C -a a 0 + a a 2 r + (1 -B) log M_ 1 /C.
13 Thus in estimation we treat the relative price index as being exogenous, although in the general equilibrium model it is an endogenous variable.
14A uniform increase ln the price level cannot have an effect on excess demand, as would be the case if a, -1, if we are to demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium.
-13 -Equation (8) 
so that the demand for money function given in equation (7) is
We must also estimate the portfolio balance equation given in equation (5c).
where xd, xf represent the peso value of domestic and foreign asset holdings by Mexican consumers, respectively, and e is the peso/USS exchange rate. This was estimated over the period [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] We thus note that all parameters are significant and have the correct sign.
We tried a number of different specifications of the portfolio balance equation, attempting to determine an impact of relative interest rates. In none of the tests did we find interest rates to be significant, however, probably reflecting the controls that were in place on Mexican interest rates for much of the sample period.
For our current application we also require some estimate of the elasticity of rural/urban migration. We have therefore used data from the period [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] to estimate snuation (Sd Thus we see that the elasticity of substitution of urban and rural labor with respect to the relative wage rate is S.0, a relatively high figure. This probably reflects the period of the sample, when urban wages were rising rapidly in response to oil price increases, and there were large movements of labor from the country to the city.
c.
Trensfer Payments and Government Financina
The government collects income, profit, and sales taxes, as well as import duties, and pays subsidies, and, implicitly, pays investment tax credits, depreciation allowances, and employment tax credits. In addition, the government must cover both domestic and foreign interest obligations on public debt. The deficit of the central government in period 1, D 1 , is then given bys
where SI represents subsidies, including tax credits, given in period 1, Ga is spending on goods and services, while the other two terms reflect domestic and foreign interest obligations of the government, based on its initial stocks of debt. Thus, for example, policies that cause the exchange rate to depreciate will increase foreign interest payments. T 1 represents total revenues of the government.
There are several types of subsidies that the government may use either to support consumption or production. The first of these is a support to value added of the sector in question given by:
where tad is the support rate given to the sector's value added in period i and the term in parenthesis is the nominal cost of the sector's value added. The -15 -second type of subsLdy is a guaranteed prLce to sectoral output. Here the government announces a support price for the aector's output. If the market price falls below thls support, then some fractLon of the dlfference ia made up by the government as a direct subsidy to producers. Hence the support payments are glven bys (P u P )ya (17) where P*aj is the target prlce of output. If the term ln (17) ls negatlve, then no subsidy is paid.
A thlrd possible subsidy le a support paid to consumption of the sector's products. Here we suppose that the government announces a maximum price, P", for consumptlon. If the market prlce of sectoral output rises above this ln perlod i, then some fraction of the difference, fi, ia paid by the government, thereby reduclng the effective prlce to consumers. Accordingly, the payment made for thls is glven by:
where xai is the total prlvate consumption of sectoral output ln period i.
The resulting deflcit is financed by a comblnation of monetization and domestic and foreign borrowing. Thus if yBflI represents the face value of domestic bonds sold by the government in period 1, and CF1 represents the dollar value of its foreign borrowing, then its budget deficit in period 2 is given by:
where r 2 (yBG1 + BO) represents the interest obligations on its initial domestlc debt plus borrowlng from period 1, and e2rF2(CFI+BO) is the interest payment on the initial stock of foreign debt plus period 1 foreign borrowing.
d. The Foreian Sector and Exchance Rate Determination
The foreign sector is represented by a simple export equation in which aggregate demand for non-oil exports is determined by domestic and foreign price indices, as well as world income. Hence the foreign currency value of non-oil exports is sensitive to changes in the exchange rate as well as to domestic price The combination of the export equation and domestic supply responses then determines aggregate exports. Demand for imports is endogenous and is derived from the domestic consumers, maximization problems, which also determine their demand for foreign assets. Foreign lending has not been modelled, but has been taken to be exogenous. Thus gross capital inflows are exogenous, but the overall change in reserves is endogenous, depending upon savings behavior and demand for imports of consumers.
Apart from producing infrastructure, collecting taxes, and financing the budget deficit, the government also attempts to adjust the exchange rate. The supply of foreign reserves yFGi, available to the government in period i is given by:
Here xFi represents the demand for foreign assets by citizens of the home country, so xF(O 1 ) -xFi represents private capital flows. CFi represents exogenous foreign borrowing by the home government.
-17 -All terms on the right hand side of equation (21) are solved from the maximization problems of the domestic and foreign consumers. The government also has a demand for assets which, we suppose is determined by an exchange rate rule.
Consider Diagram 1 representing the government's exchange rate rule in period i. Obstefeld (1984 Obstefeld ( , 1986 or Krugman (1979).
-18 -
The primary goal of our study is to be able to make certain quantitative judgments concerning the impact of changes in fiscal parameters on domestic real and financial variables. We wish to first simulate the model for the two year period 1987-88, the most recent years for which we have comparable data. In order to simulate the estimated form of our model, we have taken initial allocations to be the stocks at the end of 1986. Thus a unit of urban or rural labor, for example, is taken to be that quantity which earned 1 peso in 1986.
A unit of capital ia that amount which earned a rent of 1 peso in 1986, as is a unit of land. Stocks of money, bonds, and foreign bonds are taken to have their actual values at the end of 1986. The model ie solved using a program written by the author that computes a fixed point of the intertemporal model. The program, as well as the corresponding data set which incorporates all initial stocks and estimated parameters, is available upon request from the authors.
As a first experiment we wish to see how well our model replicates reality.
We thus carry out a simulation for 1987-88 in which all exogenous parameters take on their actual hlstorical values for those years. In particular, we take oil exports to have take their actual values. We have attempted to estimate effective rates for all taxes and tariffs, 17 and have taken the real values of government spending to be the actual values in each year. In particular, Lnvestment tax credits are uniformly set at 10 percent, as are employment tax credits. We have set the desired level of foreign reserves of the government at 0, and we have set the slope of devaluation at 4 when reserves fall below the desired level, that is, if the government has negative net reserves. If reserves rise above 0, then the slope of revaluation is set at 2. Clearly these numbers are arbitrary and in reality would be subject to constant change. Nonetheless the figures chosen serve as the basis for comparison. Finally, we will also suppose that there are no supports paid for either for production or consumption.
We will experiment in later simulations with tax credits. The resulting outcome is given in These are index numbers which we will use to make comparisons when we calculate the effects of introducing investment and employment tax credits.
-20 -Let us make some observations concerning the calibration of our model. 7. The nominal exchange rate depreciates slightly less rapidly in the simulation than in reality. 19 Recall, however, that our choices for the critical level of foreign reserves as well as for the depreciation rules shown in Figure 1 are essentially arbitrary. Actually the Mexican government does not follow a single exchange rate rule for two years, and may oppose devaluation more strongly than our rule indicates. We also show a somewhat more rapid real devaluation between the two periods than actually occurred. This is mainly due to the higher than actual simulated rate of inflation.
Nominal GDP is calculated as C
We thus note that our model seems to generate a reasonably accurate replication of actual Mexican outcomes for 1987-88. It does therefore not seem 19 We &re using the average exchange rates for Ql 1987 and Ql 1988 to represent actual nominal exchange rates. Cognterfactual Simulation.
(i) Investment Tax Credit Increase
First, we simulate the effects of introducing a uniform increase in the investment tax credit for all the sectors that use capital as an input to production. Recall that agriculture uues land and rural labor as inputs, while imports do not use physical inputs. Accordingly, we will suppose that sectors 2-6 are each now given a 20 percent investment tax credit. All other parameters in the simulation remain unchanged from the exercise reported in Table 4 .1. Table 4 .2 gives the resulting outcomes.
We thus notice that the 20 percent investment tax credit has brought about a rise in the rate of inflation in both periods, as compared with This increase has been largely caused by the rise in the government budget deficit, both in nominal terms and as a percentage of GDP. Accordingly, the aggregate loss of reserves by the Central Bank is greater in this case than in the initial simulation. We see that the real interest rate has risen significantly in both periods, in response to the incr.ssed budget deficits. In addition, real exchange rates has depreciated, leadii; consumers to decrease their holdings of domestic debt, as compared to the case of Table 4 .1.
Accordingly, the price of domatic debt falls, leading to a further increase in the real interest rate. Thus, we see that there have been uniform increases in the rates of net real capital formations across sectors. These increases are somewhat less than might be expected, as the increased real interest rates tend to mitigate the positive effects of the investment incentives. Because factors are transferred from current to capital production, there have been slight declines in real GDP in both periods, as our model's time horizon is not long enough to fully incorporate the effects of the increased sectoral capital.
(ii) CorMorate Income Tax Rate Reduction
Since a 20 percent investment tax credit seems to offor some stimulus to capital formation, but also seems to have certain adverse macroeconomic In pesos/US$. f/ Defined as WPI/e where WPI is the wholesale price index and e is the nominal exchange rate. g/ In billiono of US$. h/ Index numbers based on the corresponding levels of investment in Table 4 .1 -24 -offects, let us now suppose that the government attempts to generate an investment increase by reducing the tax rate on capital income. We will thus suppose that the statutory tax rate on capital income is lowered from 42 percent to 35 percent. The resulting outcomes are given in Table 4 .3.
We observe that this change has had rather unexpected outcomes. In particular, we see that the rate of capital formation has increased significantly, as compared to Table 4 Table 4 .2. In Table 4 .3 the corresponding figures are 9.87 and 12.08 percent.
Thus, over the two years of the simulation, the reduction in the capital income tax rate has had approximately the same aggregate effect on the real budget deficit as did raising the investment tax credit. The reduction in the capital tax rate, on the other hand, has had the effect of sharply lowering the real interest rate, unlike the previous example when real interest rates rose. The reason for this change comes from the behaviour of the real exchange rate. Here, there is an appreciation in the real exchange rate, as compared to Table 4 .2, as the relative value of domestic capital rises in response to the capital income tax reduction, which affects the entire capital stock. Accordingly, the public increases its holdings of domestic debt, causing the price of domestic bonds to rise and the real interest rate to fall. Accordingly, the incentive offered by the capital income tax cut lowers the cost of capital but does not increase the cost of borrowing, as did the investment tax credits. In addition, the tax cut brings about lower inflation rates and lower losses in foreign reserves than do the investment tax credits. Accordingly, under such circumstances, tax cuts seem to be superior to investment tax credits in stimulating investment.
-25 - We thus observe that the new regLme leads to budget deficLts that are almost ldentlcal, both in nominal and real terms, to those of Table 4 .2. The real outcomes of thli scenarlo are dlfferent, however. In partleular, we see that, wlth the exceptlon of the transportation sector, all sectors have lower rates of capltal formatlon ln thli case that ln Table 4 .2. They thus also have consLderably lower rates of capltal formatlon than ln Table 4 .3, the slmulatlon that incorporates reduced capLtal tax rates. We thus agaLn conclude that a reductlon ln the capltal income tax rate le suporlor ln promotlng Lnvestment to elther employment or investment tax credlts. Accordlngly, it appears in this case that capital income tax reductions are more effective ln stimulating investment than are investment tax credits. This example also indicates that simply examining the budgetary implications of different investment policies is not sufficient to predict their outcomes.
Finally, we look at the effects of a budget neutral reduction in the employment tax credit. We find that this policy is inferior to either of the other two in promoting capital formation. We conclude that, at least in the Mexican case, capital Income tax reductions policy seems to be rather effective.
We also note the importance of using an intertemporal model, since investment decisions are, of course, fo:ward-looking. We also observe that investment policLes effects different sectors in a non-uniform way, indicating the importance of using sector-specific capital in our model. Goods in Bonded Warehouses. These goods are subject to a 3 percent tax either on the value on which import duties are assessed or on the declared value, whichever is greater.
Profit Sharing. All businesses in Mexico are obliged to share 10 percent of their profits wlth employees.
-32 -Social Security and Payroll Taxes. Employers are obliged to contribute to social security coverage for workers (11 percent of workers' weekly wages), children's nurseries (1 percent of wages), and an occupational risk fund (from 5 to 167 percent of wages). In addition, employers contribute 5 percent of wage.
to the National Housing Fund and 1 percent of wages in support of education.
Value Added Tax. The general 15 percent rate of the value added tax (VAT) in applicable to all transactions concluded in the border and free zones.
Assets Tax. An assets tax et a rate of 2 percent of the average value of total assets of business enterprises and creditable against thelr income tax liability in Mexico, is levied effective in 1989.
Tax incentives regime in Mexico has undergoe significant changes over time.
These are briefly discussed belowt 1955-1972: Between 20% (for secondary industries) and 40% (for basic industries) corporate income of Mexican majority owned enterprises was exempted from corporate taxation for periods varying between five to ten years. The same industries also could receive, upon application, exemption from certain indirect taxes and import duties on capital goods imports.
1972-1979t
Industries that were seen to promote decentralization and regional development were granted import duties relief varying from 50% to 100%
and reduction in corporate tax liability ranging from 10% to 40% depending upon their location and type of activity.
1979-1986:
The practice of import duty exemption was continued. In addition, tax incentives certificates (CEPROFIS) providing tax credit in the range of 10-25%, depending upon location, and type and size of the industry, for investment in physical assets were introduced. These certificates were negotiable and could be used against any federal tax liability by the holder.
1986-Presents The tax incentives certificates scheme was significantly tightened and targeted to priority industries and prefered zone (See Appendix Table Al ). Top tax credit rate for CEPROFI was raised to 40% of total physical investment in 1986. In addition Mexican-owned enterprises are eligible for employment tax credit up to 30% of three times the annual area minimum wage -33 -multiplied by the number of new jobs created. in additlon, full expensing of the present value of capital consumption allowances calculated using a 7.5% discount rate was allowed in non-metropolitan areas. In the metropolitan industrialLzed areas of Mexico City, D.F., Monterrey and Guadalajara, only 60% of the present value of depreciation allowances could be deducted in the first year. R&D investment tax credit at 15% for the purchase of technological research (20% for small and micro enterprises), and 20% for capital purchases by technologLeal enterprises (30% for small and micro enterprises) are currently permlaisble.
A summary view of the taxation of business income is given in Table A2 and details regarding forgone revenues due to fiscal incentives are repeated in Table   A3 -A-ll.
-34 - (1968 , 1989 ), Nancor Herios (1989 . Intermtional Bureau of Fiscal Docunntation (1988) , and Si-Din (1989).
-36 - 
